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APPELLEE'S REPLY BRIEF 
[ Utah R.App.P. Rule 24 (c) ] 
Appellate Case No. 20060828 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The trial court did not err when it held that Utah Highway Patrol Trooper Mark 
Nichols lacked the requisite reasonable articulable suspicion when he made a traffic 
stop of Appellee's Guy Montoya's motor vehicle the evening of October 31, 2003. 
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STIPULATION OF STATUTES AND RELEVANT FACTS 
Appellee Guy Montoya stipulates to the brief statement of facts as outlined in 
the State's Opening Brief on page 5, with the exception of the following: 
1. The reason Trooper Nichols made the stop of Mr. Montoya's car was that 
he saw Mr. Montoya move out of the regular lane of travel and pull over to the curb 
without signaling. (Appellant's Brief, p. 5) 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT TROOPER NICHOLS DID 
NOT HAVE REASONABLE ARTICULABLE SUSPICION TO STOP 
MR. MONTOYA WAS NOT AN ERRONEOUS CONCLUSION OF 
LAW. 
It is a well established principle of constitutional law that the Fourth 
Amendment applies to traffic stops regardless of the reason for the stop, and that an 
officer may only "stop and question a person when [he] has reasonable, articulable 
suspicion that the person has been, is, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity." 
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932,940 (Utah 1994) (citing United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 
696,702-03,103 S.Ct 2637,2642,77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983)). According to the State's 
Opening Brief, the reason Trooper Nichols made the stop of Mr. Montoya's motor 
vehicle was that he saw Mr. Montoya pull over to the curb without using his vehicle's 
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turn signals for a continuous three seconds immediately preceding his movement to 
the right side of the road, thus violating Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-69, which was the 
Utah Traffic Code in effect at the time of Mr. Montoya's traffic stop. In relevant part, 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-69 stated: 
(1) (a) A person may not turn a vehicle or move right or 
left on a roadway or change lanes until the movement can 
be made with reasonable safety and an appropriate 
signal has been given under this section. (Emphasis 
added). 
(b) A signal of intention to turn right or left or to change 
lanes shall be given continuously for at least the last three 
seconds preceding the beginning of the turn or change. 
(Emphasis added). 
(2) A person may not stop or suddenly decrease the speed 
of a vehicle without first giving an appropriate signal to 
the operator of any vehicle immediately to the rear when 
there is opportunity to give a signal. (Emphasis added). 
The subsection which, according to the plain language and the plain reading 
of the statute, required a continuous signal for at least three seconds was subsection 
(1) (b). This subsection specifically required a continuous three-second signal under 
two conditions only, turning or changing lanes, not moving right or left upon a 
roadway. Subsection (1) (a) of the statute, which articulated the condition that 
allegedly gave Trooper Nichols probable cause to effect the traffic stop of Mr. 
Montoya, required only that an "appropriate signal" be given, but did not specify 
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what that appropriate signal should be. Similarly, subsection (2) of the statute also 
required that a driver give an "appropriate signal" to a vehicle immediately behind 
him if the driver intended to stop or decrease speed. Like subsection (1) (a), 
subsection (2) failed to specify what that "appropriate signal" should be, but it clearly 
could not have referred to the continuous, three-second turning signal required to be 
given under subsection (1) (b) because stopping or decreasing speed is not 
synonymous with turning or changing lanes. Likewise, moving right or left upon a 
roadway is not synonymous with turning or changing lanes. 
During the hearing on Defendant's Motion to Suppress, the State conceded that 
Trooper Nichols had "acknowledged that this isn't a turn, and didn't consider it a 
turn; but did consider it a movement upon the roadway." ( R. 367, Addendum A p. 
19). In the appellant's Opening Brief, the State focuses a great deal on two specific 
cases where both this Court and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals equate a 
defendant's action of pulling to the side of the road with the proscribed conduct of 
moving right or left upon a roadway, thereby holding in each case that the peace 
officers were justified in stopping the vehicles of the defendants. (Appellant's Brief, 
pp. 7-8, citing State v. Preece, 971 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1998) and U.S. v. Parker, 72 
F.3d 1444(10* Cir. 1995)). However, the city creates a wrong impression of the facts 
of these cases as applied to the present case. Upon close scrutiny of both Preece and 
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Parker, it becomes clear that the sets of circumstances surrounding those 
investigative traffic stops were factually distinguishable from the present case. 
In Preece, the circumstances involved a defendant initially driving about 
fifteen miles per hour below the speed limit, with his turn signal blinking for a quarter 
of a mile. The driver, Preece, temporarily turned his blinkers off, then back on, made 
a left-hand turn, and proceeded at about twenty to thirty miles per hour below the 
speed limit on a fifty to fifty-five miles-per-hour highway. The peace officer who had 
been following Preece finally effected an investigative stop of the vehicle when he 
noticed that Preece suddenly left the highway onto the shoulder of the road, come to 
nearly a complete stop, and then drifted back onto the highway. Preece had neither 
signaled when weaving onto the shoulder or when re-entering the highway. 
Similarly, Parker involved a defendant driving on 1-15, a freeway, who on 
more than one occasion swerved part-way into the emergency shoulder lane and 
continued to drive there for about two hundred feet before the peace officer following 
him activated his emergency lights and effected a traffic stop. 
By breaking down the facts of these cases and applying them to the present 
case, it is obvious that the defendants in both Preece and Parker displayed an entire 
pattern of erratic driving behavior which, as the courts held, gave the peace officers 
not only reasonable suspicion but probable cause to conduct investigative traffic stops 
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of the vehicles. Unlike the cases cited by the State, the case at hand does not present 
any set of circumstance similar to those above. Mr. Montoya was not driving on the 
freeway, a highway, or even a principal city street. While it is true that highways and 
small residential streets have no statutory distinction, case law affords considerable 
weight to the "totality of circumstances" surrounding a peace officer's articulable and 
reasonable suspicion to stop a driver. State v. Potter, 863 P.2d 40, 43 (Utah App. 
1993) (citing United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 1585, 104 
L.Ed.2d 1 (1989)). 
At the hearing on Defendant's Motion to Suppress, Trooper Nichols testified 
that he had "no articulable suspection (sic) that [driver Montoya] was under the 
influence at the t ime.. ." There was no evidence of erratic driving behavior such as 
the ones displayed by the defendants in the cases cited by the State. In fact, there 
was no evidence of erratic driving behavior by Mr. Montoya whatsoever. 
As further support for its argument that Mr. Montoya's actions violated the 
"move right or left" portion of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-69, the State also focuses on 
U.S. v. Gregoire, 425 F.3d 872 (10th Cir. 2005), a case involving a driver who merged 
onto 1-70, another freeway, without signaling while he was still on the on-ramp. 
Again, the roadway in Gregoire was designed for high speed traffic, unlike a 
residential street, and there were clear road markings which indicated when a driver 
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must begin to merge and therefore signal. As already established during the hearing 
on Defendant's Motion to Suppress, Washington is an unmarked street with no lanes 
to speak of, and the action of pulling one's vehicle over to the curb in order to park 
is not tantamount with driving onto or off a freeway ramp. It must also be noted that 
Gregoire acknowledged that the issue before the court was a "close" call, citing a 
Seventh Circuit case involving Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-69, where a panel of the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that a traffic stop based on the statute was 
invalid and failed to establish probable cause. Id. at 877 (citing United States v. 
Powell 929 F.2d 1190 (7th Cir. 1991). 
In sum, Mr. Montoya's action of pulling his vehicle by the side of a residential 
curb in order to park , while superficially akin to the circumstances surrounding 
Preece, Parker, and Gregoire, is diametrically distinguishable from weaving in and 
out of an emergency shoulder lane on a freeway or highway, and also very different 
than merging from a clearly marked on-ramp into a high-speed freeway. Thus, 
neither Utah nor Tenth Circuit case law truly supports the State's argument that Mr. 
Montoya's actions the evening of October 31, 2003 ubiquitously required the use of 
turn signals for a continuous three-second period immediately preceding his vehicle's 
movements. 
The closest sources available for a definition of which type of signal was 
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"appropriate" at the time of Mr. Montoya's actions are Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-70, 
Utah CodeAnn. § 41-6-71, and the 2003 Utah Driver Handbook used at the hearing 
on Defendant's Motion to Suppress. The three statutes, § 41-6-69, § 41-6-70, and § 
41-6-71, when read in conjunction with the Driver Handbook, which by itself is of 
course not controlling, clearly seem to establish that different types of signals applied 
to different types of vehicle action. For example, according to both § 41 -6-71 and the 
Driver Handbook, a specific hand signal or light signal was required when a driver 
was turning, and another specific hand signal or light signal was required when a 
driver was decreasing speed or stopping. 
Neither § 41-6-70, § 41-6-71, or the Driver Handbook stated what type of 
signal was "appropriate" when a driver was moving right or left upon a roadway or 
pulling over to a curb. The Driver Handbook only articulated that a continuous, 
three-second turn signal was expected when a driver turned, changed lanes, or pulled 
away from a curb. Id. 
To shed a bit more light on the matter, Utah Code Ann. § 41 -6-70 required that 
a "stop signal" be given either by a driver's hand or a "signal lamp," but this statute 
also failed to specify what constituted an appropriate lamp signal in a stop situation. 
Again, though not controlling, the only other source available for a definition of 
"appropriate signals" was the 2003 Utah Driver Handbook, which stated that the 
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appropriate signal in a stop or decreased-speed situation was the application of a 
vehicle's brake lights, provided they were "operating properly and [could] be readily 
seen." (July 2003 Utah Driver Handbook, p. 12). 
The most accurate statement that can be said in terms of Mr. Montoya's 
statutory obligations under Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-69 (1) (a) is that an "appropriate 
signal" needed to be made. Furthermore, given that Mr. Montoya's actions also 
closely fit the description under § 41-6-69 (2), § 41-6-70, and § 41-6-71 (3), 
decreasing his vehicle's speed and stopping, there is every clear indication that an 
appropriate signal, the application of his brake lamps, was given. The State only 
argues, in Roman numeral I of its Opening Brief, that "according to the plain reading 
of the statute, when Mr. Montoya changed or moved his vehicle from the lane of 
travel onto the far right shoulder... the ordinance requires he use his signal." (Id. at 
p. 9). However, the evidence demonstrates that Mr. Montoya in fact did not move 
from the lane of travel onto a "far right shoulder" because there was no far right 
shoulder of travel or of emergency to move into. There was only a residential street 
with no lane markings and scarcely enough space for vehicles to park along both 
sides of the road. Thus, an appropriate and sufficient signal for drivers immediately 
to the rear would have been Mr. Montoya's properly operating brake lights. At the 
hearing on Defendant's Motion to Suppress, Trooper Nichols testified that Mr. 
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Montoya's motor vehicle appeared in every respect to be operating properly and no 
evidence has been presented to contest the fact that his brake lights could be readily 
seen. 
Therefore, because there was no plain statutory language that required Mr. 
Montoya to use a continuous, three-second turn or lane change signal before slowing 
down to park his motor vehicle by the curb, and because no case law has been cited 
that mandated this course of action, Officer Nichols did not stop Mr. Montoya's 
motor vehicle pursuant to the plain language and plain reading of Utah Code Ann. § 
41-6-69, and his investigative stop does not pass muster for a Fourth Amendment 
inquiry into probable cause. 
II. BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ULTIMATELY RULE ON 
THE MEMORANDUM OR THE ARGUMENTS REGARDING THE 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF UTAH CODE § 41-6-69, TROOPER 
NICHOL'S GOOD FAITH RELIANCE ON THE STATUTE IS 
IRRELEVANT. 
The State takes issue with the trial court's finding that Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-
69 was "ambiguous," arguing that by implication, the trial court also held that the 
statute was unconstitutional as applied to Mr. Montoya. (Id.) Though the defendant 
did submit a Memorandum of Law arguing that the statute should be found void for 
vagueness, there is absolutely no evidence in either the court record or the State's 
Brief that the trial court ever read this Memorandum, let alone make its findings 
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statute was unconstitutional as applied to Mr. Montoya. (Id.) Though the defendant 
did submit a Memorandum of Law arguing that the statute should be found void for 
vagueness, there is absolutely no evidence in either the court record or the State's 
Brief that the trial court ever read this Memorandum, let alone make its findings 
based on the arguments contained therein. The reason for this i^  that the 
Memorandum was submitted at the time of the hearing on Defendant's Motion to 
Suppress, and the court had been unaware that such a document had been prepared 
by defendant's counsel. 
Further, while it is true that the trial court did state as part of its holding that 
it found the statute ambiguous, the court did not ignore the question of whether 
Trooper Nichols had witnessed a violation of law, as the State argues. In fact, the 
court gave its reasoning as to why it believed a violation of law had not obcurred by 
giving a hypothetical set of circumstances in which Mr. Montoya's actions would 
have violated the statute if he had failed to signal when he was parking along State 
Street, where there are marked lanes and a designated far right shoulder for parallel 
parking. By implication, the court was indicating that given such a scenario, Mr. 
Montoya would have been either changing lanes, or engaging in the type of action 
envisioned in the very cases cited by the State, such as Preece, Parker, ana Gregoire. 
This line of reasoning goes precisely to the question of whether Mr. Montoya did or 
11 
found, "I've heard no evidence that this driver impaired anybody in any way, shape 
or form." (Tr. 23, 3-4). 
Because the trial court did find that there was not a probable cause to the stop 
{Id. at p. 23), the whole issue of whether the statute should or should not have been 
declared void for vagueness becomes irrelevant, and since that particular issue was 
hardly raised by either party at the hearing on Defendant's Motion to Suppress, 
Roman numeral // of the State's argument is moot and need not be addressed. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court having found to its satisfaction that the facts of the present case 
did not constitute a violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-69, its granting of 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress should be treated with a "measure of discretion." 
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994). For the foregoing reasons, the decision of 
the trial court suppressing evidence and dismissing the case should be affirmed and 
the case should not be reinstated or remanded for further proceedings. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 30™ day of January, 2007. 
y^obert M!" Archuleta 
/ Attorney for Defendant/ Appellee 
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